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THE BASIS OF THE
NATURAL LAW IN
LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY
JAMES W. BYRNE*
T HE QUESTION of the basis of "the law of nature" in Locke's philosophy
is a relevant inquiry in view of the ambivalence which begins to
appear in his later works which deal with morality. In the "early essays
on the law of nature" the basis for the law of nature was a rationalistic
one, that is, law was the proximate basis of moral obligation. It was called
a natural law because it was thought that this law could be discovered by
using the faculty of reason. In this way the will of God which Locke
thought of as the ultimate basis of moral obligation was made known to
man in a natural way. Thus, in the early essays Locke described the law
of nature "as being the decree of the divine will discernible by the light
of nature and indicating what is and what is not in conformity with
rational nature, and for this very reason commending or prohibiting."'
But as Locke continued the epistemological inquiries in the Essay which
he had begun in these early essays, certain antinomies began to appear
which require a careful analysis before the true basis of the law of nature,
as the conclusion of his mature reflections on the epistemological ques-
tions of the Essay itself, can be determined. It will be the work of this
article to attempt to point out the real basis of the law of nature in the
light of the conclusions of the Essay, and to show what these conclusions
really meant to Locke's moral philosophy.
In order to establish the basis for Locke's doctrine of the law of nature
in the light of the metaphysical principles inherent in the Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding, it will be necessary for clarity's sake to set
forth in a summary way Locke's doctrine of law and to compare it with
the classical definition of law. St. Thomas Aquinas gave expression to
*Ph.D., Fordham University; Associate Professor of Philosophy, St. John's
University.
L LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 111 (von Leyden ed. 1954).
the classical definition of law when he de-
fined it as "nothing else than an ordinance
of reason for the common good, made by
him who has care of the community, and
promulgated.' 2 Thus, the traditional mean-
ing of law was something pertaining to rea-
son. "Since reason is the universal rule and
measure of action law then becomes an
obligation prescribed by reason.' 3
Locke, on the other hand, departed from
this tradition by adopting the Nominalist
solution regarding the essence of law, that
is, a voluntarist theory or a legislative
ethics.4 This voluntarist solution with regard
to law began with William of Occam, who
was an extreme voluntarist of the fourteenth
century. For Occam law is will, 5 and reason
can never know a law by knowing the nature
of things. Thus, God's will could be known
only through revelation, and all law is posi-
tive law.
For Locke law is the will of a superior, or
of one who has the right of commanding
obedience; "it is the decree of a superior
will, wherein the formal cause of a law
appears to consist. . . ."' The proper func-
tion of law is to legislate, that is, "it lays
down what is and is not to be done.. .. " 7
2 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 1-I1, q. 90, art. 4.
St. Thomas' definition has been chosen as repre-
sentative of the classical definition, because as
Huntington Cairns states: "St. Thomas' legal writ-
ings are more than the working out of a jurispru-
dence adjusted to the thirteenth-century thinking.
They are also an epitome of the major juristic prin-
ciples which had come down to him tested by all
the resources of Scholasticism." CAIRNS, LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 175 (1949).
3 CAIRNS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 169.
4 LOCKE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 51.
5 For example, the will of the sovereign is law.
"This latter idea is an inheritance from the Byzan-
tine period of Roman law...." CAIRNS, Op. cit.
supra note 2, at 169.
6 LOCKE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 111-13.
7 Id. at 113.
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and the fact that the superior who com-
mands has a right and power over us makes
the law, that is, the will of such a superior
binding.
Law is at the heart of Locke's theory of
civil society. According to Locke, civil gov-
ernment originated because of the need for
a set of laws to govern society in order to
preserve man's natural right to property."
However, for Locke law was essentially a
branch of ethics, and in their essence laws
were moral rules." Furthermore, because of
Locke's voluntaristic conception of law, the
traditional distinction between the eternal
and the temporal law had no meaning.
Rather, since law is that which is set up by
an authority for the measure of conduct and
expresses the will of such an authority, all
laws seem to be positive law.' 0 According
to Locke rules of morality, which included
rules of law, were distinguished from other
rules because they were enforced or were
associated with rewards and punishments.
In the Essay Locke maintained that the
rules or laws to which men generally refer
their actions in order to judge their morality
fall into three classes; the divine law, the
civil law, and the law of opinion or reputa-
tion.
The divine law is the will of the creator,
which can be promulgated by the light of
nature, and then it is called the law of na-
ture, or by revelation, and then it is known
8 "The great and chief end, therefore, of men's
uniting into commonwealth, and putting them-
selves under government, is the preservation of
their property, to which in the state of nature there
are many things wanting." LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 71 (Peardon ed. 1952).
9 1 LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDER-
STANDING 474 (Fraser ed. 1959); cf. CAIRNS, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 166-67.
10 ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 41 (Hanley ed.
1947).
LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY
as divine positive law.11 By divine law
Locke meant the law which God has set to
the actions of men. Locke thought that it
was clear to all men that God has given a
rule whereby men should govern their ac-
tions, and that God has promulgated this
law. God has dominion over his creatures,
and therefore as a superior being he has the
right to legislate for them. By his goodness
and wisdom God directs creatures to what is
best for them, and furthermore God has the
power to enforce his law by reward and
punishment. Finally, Locke maintained that
the only true standard of moral rectitude is
a comparison of human actions with God's
law. By this comparison men can judge their
actions morally good or evil, that is, whether,
as duties or sins, they are likely to procure
them happiness or misery from the hands of
the Almighty.1 2 Law is the standard by
which men judge the moral rectitude or de-
pravity of their actions, and the true nature
of law is that some reward or punishment is
annexed to the performance of an action.
Civil law is "the rule set by the common-
wealth to the actions of those who belong to
it," and "is another rule to which men refer
their actions; to judge whether they be crim-
inal or no."' 13 The civil law is the expression
of the will of the majority which derives its
right of dominion and power of sanction
from the "social contract," by which society
invested a limited authority in civil govern-
ment by a free donation of certain human
rights to the State.'4 However, the law of
11 1 LOCKE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 475.
12 Ibid.
13 Id. at 476.
14 LOCKE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 55: "When any
number of men have so consented to make one
community or government, they are thereby pres-
ently incorporated and make one body politic
nature is prior to civil society and it is this
law which determines which rights are to be
donated to the State, and whether laws are
just.
The third class of laws to which men con-
form their actions, and by which they judge
of the moral rectitude of their actions is the
law of opinion or reputation. This type of
law refers only to what custom in a certain
time and place has praised as virtuous or
condemned as vice.' 5 The popular test of the
morality of an action is connected with com-
mendation and disgrace in the eyes of the
members of the society in which a man lives.
However, Locke maintained that the law of
opinion or reputation varies according to
the place and in the various epochs of his-
tory. Nevertheless, he rejected the charge
that he makes public opinion the ultimate
nature of right or wrong, but it is the test
that the majority of men use as a standard
of morality. Rather, Locke himself believed
wherein the majority have a right to act and con-
clude the rest." Ci. "For when any number of men
have, by the consent of every individual, made a
community, they have thereby made that commu-
nity one body, with a power to act as one body,
which is only by the will and determination of the
majority ..." Ibid.
15 1 LOCKE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 477: "Thus the
measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed
virtue and vice is this approbation or dislike, praise
or blame, which, by a secret and tacit consent,
establishes itself in the several societies, tribes, and
clubs of men in the world: whereby several actions
come to find credit or disgrace amongst them,
according to the judgment, maxims, or fashion of
that place. For, though men uniting into politic
societies, have resigned up to the public the dispos-
ing of all their force, so that they cannot employ
it against any fellow-citizens any further than the
law of the country directs: yet they retain still the
power of thinking well or ill, approving or disap-
proving of the actions of those whom they live
amongst, and converse with: and by this approba-
tion and dislike they establish amongst themselves
what they will call virtue and vice."
that the law of right and wrong is in itself
eternal and unalterable. However, he does
not explain the ground on which his moral
faith is based.' 6
Locke does not feel that he has aban-
doned his own notion of law in making
commendation and disgrace one of the
strongest motives by which men are moved
to adhere to public morality. 7
From the point of view of Locke's theory
of society, the law of nature is of the greatest
importance, because it serves him in ex-
plaining pre-political society, and the origin
of civil society, that is, the law of nature is
the means by which men have certain
inalienable rights for the greater protection
of which they have united into civil society.
The law of nature is also necessary to im-
pose a limit on the will of the sovereign after
the formation of civil society.
In seeking the basis of Locke's doctrine
of natural law, it will likewise be necessary
to consider the metaphysical structure of his
philosophy, and to connect his notion of the
law of nature with his metaphysics. In the
early "essays on the law of nature," Locke
had accepted such metaphysical notions as
God's existence and the teleological struc-
ture of the universe as a support for his
theory of natural law. Furthermore, the law
of nature was said to be a law which indi-
cated "what is and what is not in conformity
with rational nature. . . ." But when Locke
continued his epistemological inquiries in
the Essay, his metaphysics underwent some
drastic changes.
As a result of the critique of human
knowledge contained in the Essay, Locke
11; Id. at 477 n.1.
17 Id. at 479.
is LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 101
(von Leyden ed. 1954).
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was aware that the proximate basis for the
law of nature must be re-examined. Our
knowledge of reality is the essences that
exist in our minds. But we cannot know the
real essences, because we cannot have a
knowledge of substance as such. We can,
however, know something about particular
sorts of substances by giving a name to the
various combinations of sense qualities that
are usually observed together, and this is
called the nominal essence. Thus, in the
light of Locke's conclusions regarding the
impossibility of knowing the real essences of
either material or spiritual substances, the
proximate metaphysical foundation of the
law of nature was destroyed, because,
since man is a substance his real nature is
unknowable and cannot be the means of
discovering the content of the natural law,
and hence cannot serve as the proximate
basis for this law.
When Locke's epistemological inquiries
had sufficiently undermined the proximate
basis of the natural law in the traditional
sense (that is, as founded on the nature of
man), he began to look to the nominal
essence of man for a way of expressing
God's will as far as morality was concerned.
Thus, the hedonistic elements of his moral
philosophy, which first appeared in his paper
Of Ethick in General, began to come to the
foreground in the ethics of the Essay. The
idea of the law of nature is not abandoned,
but he seeks a proximate basis for it more
in accord with the principles of his philoso-
phy as it developed in the Essay. Since hu-
man nature cannot be known in its real
essence, then the moral law must be revealed
to man in some other natural way, that is,
some phenomenal manifestation on the
sense level. Consequently, good and evil
must be attached to the nominal essence of
mnan.
LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY
Pleasure and pain were the means by
which human reason could discover the suit-
ableness or unsuitableness of action to the
moral law. Thus, in the Essay, Locke defined
moral good and evil as "the conformity or
disagreement of our voluntary actions to
some law, whereby good and evil is drawn on
us, from the will and power of the lawmaker;
which good and evil, pleasure or pain, at-
tending our observance or breach of the law
by the decree of the law-maker, is that we
call reward and punishment."'19 Good is de-
fined as an aptness in a thing to produce
pleasure in us, and evil as an aptness in a
thing to produce pain in us. 20 Thus, Locke
says that "things then are good or evil, only
in reference to pleasure and pain." 21 By
pleasure and pain he means either bodily
pleasure or pain known through sensation,
or mental pleasure or pain known through
reflection. 22 Pleasure and pain, however, are
the secondary sense qualities of certain
objects, and thus they are only subjective
modifications of the perceiver. Therefore,
when we call something good or evil, we
attribute a quality to it which we do not
know to exist in the object as such, since all
we know is that the object causes pleasure
or pain in us. Thus, we have no knowledge
of good as such, but only of certain phenom-
enal manifestations of an object in terms of
sensation.
Nevertheless, the law of nature really
19 1 LOCKE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 474.
20 Id. at 340-41.
21 Id. at 303.
22 Id. at 306: "[B]y pleasure and pain, delight and
uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I
have above intimated) to mean not only bodily
pain and pleasure, but whatsoever delight or un-
easiness is felt by us, whether arising from any
grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection."
existed as a substratum for moral actions,2 3
but it was lost under the phenomenal aspects
of human existence, and there was no way
for human reason to discover it except
through the pleasure and pain caused by the
objects of experience, and this is not to
know the law as such, but only the manifes-
tation of the law. Just as human nature was
real but unknown to human reason, and the
human mind must be content with the phe-
nomenal manifestations of that nature in
particular instances (the nominal essence),
so the law of nature was real, and although
Locke never said that it was unknowable
because he felt that God had sufficiently re-
vealed the moral law to us for our practical
lives, yet the pleasure and pain that God has
annexed to certain actions served as the
phenomenal manifestation of moral good
and evil. However, Locke's theological prin-
ciples maintained that the historical evi-
dences gave certitude only to the fact that
Jesus is the Messiah, and only moral proba-
bility to the other parts of the Scriptures.
Thus, the natural law would have only moral
probability if it were based only on the
Scriptures. Therefore, Locke sought some
other basis besides that supplied by revela-
tion.
That Locke's theory regarding the mean-
ing of the law of nature is ambiguous is
attested to by the fact that Tyrrell wrote to
him asking for a clarification of his doctrine.
Locke answered Tyrrell's inquiries in a let-
ter dated August 4th, 1690, in which he
tried to remove some of the ambiguities
Tyrrell complained surrounded his doctrine
in the Essay concerning the meaning of the
23 STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 21
(1953): "We thus arrive at the conclusion that
Locke cannot have recognized any law of nature
in the proper sense of the term."
law of nature. In this letter Locke refers
Tyrrell to Book I, c. 3, s. 13 "where it was
proper for me to speak my opinion of the
law of nature; 12 4 and to Book II, c. 27, s. 7
and 8 "where I have occasion to speak indef-
initely of the divine law. ' ' 25 Locke main-
tained that in order for practical principles
to be innate, the knowledge of the rewards
and punishments attached to the moral laws
would have to be innate also. In other
words, an innate idea would express not
only the essence of the thing, but also all
that was implied by that essence. Thus
Locke thought that pleasure and pain, which
were the means of recognizing moral actions
in the practical order, would also be im-
printed on the mind with the idea of the
thing, if that idea was innate. But he holds
that this is not so "unless with an innate law
they can suppose an innate Gospel too."2 6
Thus, it seems that Locke held that the
knowledge of divine positive law is neces-
sary in order to know the moral law because
it is through this divine positive law that we
learn of the sanctions attached to the moral
law. However, Locke immediately asserts
that his denial of an innate law does not
mean that he holds only to positive law, but,
on the contrary, he maintained that there is
also the law of nature.
In this letter to Tyrrell, Locke attempted
to clarify certain misunderstandings about
where his law of nature was to be found. It
is worth noting that Tyrrell's objections
focussed on two points: in the first place
that the rewards and punishments attached
to this law are in the next life, and therefore,
24 Letter From John Locke to Tyrrell, Aug. 4,
1690, in 1 KING, LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE 366 (1830).
25 Id. at 367.
26 1 LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UN-
DERSTANDING 78 (Fraser ed. 1959).
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are not known naturally; and in the second
place that it seems Locke finds this law in
the Sacred Scriptures. 27 However, Locke
replied that these objections arose because
the readers misunderstood his intention, and
thus accused him of lacking clarity. Actually
Locke maintained that he was not attempt-
ing to base the law of nature on the divine
law, but rather he only intended to point out
the fact that men judge the moral rectitude
of their actions by comparing them with the
divine law. In these two sections of the
Essay, he claimed only to show that men
receive a standard for their moral ideas
from some divine revelation, no matter
whether revealed naturally (the law of na-
ture) or miraculously.28
Locke held that men became aware of the
content of their moral ideas by comparing
their actions with the divine law. But then
how can Locke speak of this content of the
divine law as something naturally known
without revelation? Furthermore, if human
nature cannot be the source of the content
of the natural law by apprehending the
intelligibility of man's nature, and his rela-
tions with God and the world, then how does
man become aware of the divine law in a
natural way? It would seem that Locke is
guilty of the error of dogmatism in account-
ing for the moral ideas which he said com-
prised the law of nature. "He simply made
the law of nature include the moral princi-
ples of the liberal Christian and Whigs of
his day. ' 29 Leo Strauss points out that for
27 Cf. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSO-
PHY 22 (1950): "To a great extent, the source of
Locke's inspiration on the subject of natural law
was the Bible, which he cites freely."
28 Letter From John Locke to Tyrrell, op. cit. supra
note 24, at 366-73.
29 LAMPRECHT, THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHI-
LOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE 86 (1918).
LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY
Locke ultimately the law of nature is "a
creature of the understanding rather than a
work of nature," ' and this law, as con-
tained in Locke's philosophy, "formulates
the conditions of peace or, more generally
stated, of 'public happiness,' or 'the prosper-
ity of any people.' "31
Thus, when Locke seemingly realized the
inadequacy of his attempt to base morality
on reason alone, he introduced a non-ration-
al standard, that is, his hedonistic approach
to the origin of moral ideas. The difficulties
of his epistemology gradually led him to
drop all reference to the abstract morality
of "mixed modes," and his purely rational-
istic ethics was never carried through to a
consistent and successful conclusion. Thus,
"the ambiguity of his treatment of the nature
of ideas" 32 gradually led to the abandon-
ment of an abstract ethics, and his hedonistic
approach began to come to the fore in the
latter half of Book II of the Essay. Ultimate-
ly, the basis for all morality is not the intel-
ligibility that reason can discover in the
nature of reality, but the sanctions attached
to morally good or evil actions by the divine
will of the Creator, which sanctions are
phenomenalized as pleasure and pain and
are thus perceptible to the senses.
However, despite the changes that oc-
curred in the Essay, Locke does not give up
his doctrine of the law of nature, even
though it became apparent that the philo-
sophical work of his maturity, that is, the
Essay, has completely undermined the basis
of natural law, even in the limited sense in
which he meant natural law, that is, the
divine law known in a natural way without
30 STRAUSS, op. cit. supra note 23, at 230.
31 Id. at 229.
32 LAMPRECHT, op. cit. supra note 29, at 87.
revelation. In what direction, then, was
Locke's philosophy to develop? Clearly, it
would seem that Locke should have devel-
oped his moral philosophy in the same direc-
tion as the later utilitarian ethics of Bent-
ham, and thus abandon all reference to
natural law.3 3 The reason that Locke does
not openly espouse a utilitarian ethics seems
to lie in the general history of his own time.
In the seventeenth century the Platonic
approach to morality (that is, the origin of
moral ideas) took the form of the doctrine
of innate ideas. Locke opposed this theory
as proposed by Lord Herbert of Cherbury.
However, in the Essay Locke still held to
some type of intuition as necessary for cer-
titude in human knowledge .3 Hence even
in the conclusion to the Essay (Bk. IV)
Locke still held on to the doctrine that
human knowledge of moral ideas which was
certain could be obtained by our natural
faculties "which by their own expansion,
and not by the reception of notions from
without, are not only capable of but must
33 DRIVER, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME
ENGLISH THINKERS OF THE AUGUSTAN AGE 81
(Hearnshaw ed. 1923): "His great difference from
Bentham lay in the fact that he posited this law at
the back of things, and believed it the source of
pleasure; whereas Bentham rested his philosophy
on no such piece of cosmic speculation, but upon
the simple pleasure-pain fact of experience." For
an opposite viewpoint, cf. MORRIS, LOCKE, BERKE-
LEY, HUME 56 (1931): "Certainly he thought that
the primary duty of man is to seek happiness and
avoid misery, and certainly he thought of happi-
ness in terms of pleasures; and it never occurred to
him to doubt whether happiness is the highest pos-
sible aim of man. Probably, therefore, his moral
theory when worked out would have been not un-
like the utilitarian system developed by Bentham a
century later. Certainly Locke's view is the same
as Bentham's in regard to the bearing of morality
on politics."
-3 2 LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UN-
DERSTANDING 165-75 (Fraser ed. 1959).
necessarily expand into its own specific
flower. ' '3 ' Thus, in some passages of the
Essay it seems that Locke himself had a
confused perception of the distinction be-
tween innate ideas and innate faculties.
Consequently, there are two tendencies in
Locke's moral philosophy, one retaining a
trace of Platonic idealism (the reflective
aspect of knowledge), and the other stress-
ing sensation as the ultimate element in
knowledge. Locke never succeeded in syn-
thesizing this duality into the unity of a
philosophical system. For this reason, there-
fore, there is a difference between Locke's
utilitarian ethics and that of Bentham. 6
Although Locke's conception of natural
law may be largely utilitarian in the practi-
cal order, his theory of natural law is based
on the existence of a real law or logos which
is bound up with the order of the physical
universe. Human reason cannot discover the
existence of this law, but its real existence
is attested to by the fact that this inexorable
law takes its revenge on those who disregard
it by bringing pain in its wake, or by causing
pleasure in those who observe its precepts.
Thus, the law of nature can be conceived of
because of its physical manifestations which
are perceptible to the senses, but the senses
do not give us any knowledge of the content
of this law, and thus it is impossible to dis-
cover a rational approach to the moral life.
Consequently, this law can hardly be called
a law of reason, but rather it seems to be a
law of instinct, since the morality of actions
is judged by a pleasure and pain theory,
and not by discovering the inner intelligibil-
ity of moral actions. So, ultimately Locke
reduces the law of nature to a non-rational
35 1 LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS 123
(1882).
36 DRIVER, op. cit. supra note 33.
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basis, that is, the cosmic forces taking re-
venge on those who violate the laws of the
physical universe. Thus, ultimately Locke
must turn to the divine law to receive any
real content for his moral laws. But Locke
never gives up his attachment to the law of
nature as a basic principle in his moral phi-
losophy and considers this law to lie at the
basis of his moral theory, although it is of
little use in the practical order, and conse-
quently, expediency and utilitarianism must
be the guide to our right actions in the prac-
tical order.
If one would understand Locke's doc-
trine of natural law, therefore, he must see
that there are two conceptions of the natural
law, the traditional doctrine and the Lockean
doctrine. According to the traditional doc-
trine the idea of natural law is the result "of
the doctrines of the priority of the intellect
over the will (law is reason) in both God and
man, of the knowability of the essences of
things and their essential order, their meta-
physical being and the ordered hierarchy of
values." 7
On the other hand, Locke's notion of
natural law is a revolutionary and individ-
ualistic interpretation directly bound up
with the Hobbesian notion of "the state of
nature" and also with the state as a social
unit, and this doctrine ultimately is con-
nected with the notion of a free contract as
the beginning of society, which is both arbi-
trary and artificial and in no way can be
traced to the nature of things themselves but
"is determined by utility and is not meta-
physically necessary. ' 38 Also in the Lockean
conception the primacy of the will is
7 ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAw 41 (Hanley ed.
1947).
38 Id. at 5.
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stressed, and the law becomes a command
of the will, rather than a dictate of reason.
As a result, positivism is the consequent in
both philosophy and theology. This positiv-
istic approach to knowledge of the natural
law results in "the renouncing of all efforts
to know the essences of things (nominalism),
the repudiation of the metaphysics of hier-
archized being and value.'"" Hence, if
Locke speaks of a law of nature after the
critical evaluation of human knowledge con-
tained in the Essay, he does not have the
usual meaning for moral law. He merely
means that the laws of the universe itself
express the will of the Creator, who arbi-
trarily willed that the universe be governed
by this set of laws, which can be naturally
known to us by the pleasure and pain
attached to the respecting or disrespecting of
their observance. It is only through pleas-
ure and pain that we know in a natural way
of what the will of the Creator consists.
Thus, there is no objective way of ascertain-
ing a hierarchy of moral values. Man must
be content to assay such a hierarchy through
his experience, and in a pragmatic appraisal
of pleasure and pain decide on what brings
the greatest ultimate pleasure. in this way a
hierarchy of pleasures is established. The
common good, which is not a real thing, but
the sum total of all particular goods or in-
terests of individuals, becomes the ultimate
basis for judging the ordering of the value
into a hierarchy. So, whatever will bring
peace and prosperity becomes the basis for
determining the morality of action both on
the part of the State and the individual.
Civil law becomes nothing but the will of
the majority, based on this utilitarian esti-
mate.
The history of philosophy after Locke's
39 Id. at 41.
time developed both sides of the duality
latent in the principles of Locke's philoso-
phy. Condillac and his followers reduced the
philosophy of sensation to its simplest ex-
pression by removing the element of reflec-
tion from Locke's philosophy. On the other
hand, the Scottish and German writers con-
centrated on the ideal aspects of Locke's
epistemology. The moral philosophy, which
was based on Condillac's interpretation of
Locke, was accompanied by a morality of
interest, while the ideal philosophy, which
took its origin from Locke's philosophy, was
accompanied by the assertion of the exist-
ence of a moral faculty.
4
Undoubtedly, the many historical factors
at work in the seventeenth century ac-
counted for Locke's continuing naively to
employ the notion of natural law in the poli-
tical writings of his maturity. However, the
application of the law of nature to his poli-
tical doctrine makes it clear that the law of
nature had become nothing more than the
sum of the dictates of reason in regard to
men's "mutual security," or to "the peace
and safety of mankind."' 41 Leo Strauss thus
concludes that "The law of nature, as Locke
conceives of it, formulates the conditions of
peace or more generally stated of 'public
happiness' or the 'prosperity of any peo-
ple.' "4 But natural law thus understood "as
the formulation of the conditions of peace
and public happiness, is utilitarian."' ",3 In the
last analysis the influence of the Essay is
apparent even when Locke appeals to the
law of nature in his treatises on govern-
ment. This is evident because the content of
(Continued on page 87)
40 1 LECKY, op. cit. supra note 35, at 124-25.
4L STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 228
(1953).
42 Id. at 229.
43 Id. at 235 n.107.
 
